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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2492 
JOHN D. HOSPELHORN AND WILLIAM F. AYRES, 
ANCILLARY RECEIVERS OF THE BALTIMORE 
TRUST COMP.ANY, A CORPORATION, OR-
GANIZED AND EXISTING UNDER AND 
BY VIRTUE OF THE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND,. 
Petitioners, 
versus 
CHARLES S. CORBIN, Defendant. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Su.prmne 
Court of .Appeals of Virginia.: 
Your petitioners, John D. Hospelhorn and ·wmiam F. 
Ayres, Ancillary Receivers of the Baltimore Trust Company, 
respectfully represent that they are aggrieved by tha.t cer-
tain final judgment and order of the Circuit Court of North-
ampton County, Virginia, entered against them on the 13th 
day of March, 1941, in proceedings held pursuant to a notice 
of motion for judgment for $1,000.00 and interest by your 
petitioners, the plaintiffs in the Court below, against a resident 
of Northampton County, Virginia, Charles S. Corbin, the de-
fendant in the said lower Court. A transcript of the record 
accompanies this petition, from which will appear tl1e nature 
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of the proceeding, the facts and circumstances out of which 
it arose, and the chief incidents of the trial. 
In said notice of motion for judgment claim was asserted 
for $1,000.00 with interest, for the unpaid statutory liability 
assessments made upon said Charles S. Corbin as a stock-
holder owning one hundred shares of stock of said Baltimore 
Trust Company, as provided under the Constitution and 
statutes of the State of Maryland, said Baltimore Trust Com-
pany being a banking corporation organized and existing 
under the Constitution and statutes of Maryland. 
To the notice of motion for judgment the defendant filed 
pleas of the three-years and five-years statutes of limitations. 
The court sustained the three-years statute of limitations. By 
agreement a jury was waived and the matter was tried to the 
Court. The Court entered final order and judgment dismiss-
ing the action. 
2• *FACTS. 
On May 15 and May 20, 1930, Charles S. Corbin, whose ad-
dress was then 1829 Eutaw Place, Baltimore, Maryland, be-
came the holder and owner of 100 shares of the capital stock 
of The Baltimore Trust Company of the par value of $10.00 a 
share, and has ever since continued to hold and own the said 
100 shares of the capital stock of The Baltimore Trust Com-
pany in fact and upon the books and records of the said 
banking institution. 
On January 5, 1935, the Bank Commissioner of the State of 
Marvla.nd, pursuant to ~.\.rtiele 11, Seetion 9AA of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland, 1935 Edition, having first obtained 
the written consent of the Governor and the Attome~r General, 
took possession of the assets and business of The Baltimore 
Trust Company as statutory Receiver thereof, with all the 
powers, privileges, duties and obligations attaching thereto. 
Thereupon, on the same day, in pursuance of the laws of the 
State of Maryland, the said Bank Commissioner instituted 
suit in the name of the State of Maryland against the said 
The Baltimore Trust Company in Circuit Court No. 2 of 
Baltimore City for the purpose of having the said Court as-· 
sume jurisdiction over the assets and business of the said 
bank then in his hands for liquidation as such statutory Re-
ceiver. On the same day the said Bank Commissioner, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 11, Section 9B of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1935 Edition, substituted 
the said John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy Bank Commissioner; 
as Receiver of the said banking institution, which substitution· 
was approved by Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City by its 
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order '' that John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy Bank Commissioner, 
be named, substituted and continued as Receiver'' of the said 
bank, with power and authority to take charge of the books 
and assets of every kind and to collect nll the debts due the 
said bank. 
Thereafter, on November 13, 1935, the Circuit Coti.rt No. 2 
of Baltimore City, pursuant to Article III, section 39 of the 
Constitution of the State of :Maryland and Section 72 of 
Article 11 of the Annotated Code of Maryland levied and im-
posed an assessment of $10.00 a share on each share of 
3"" the capital *stock of the said bank, the same being found 
necessary to meet the liability of the said bank to its de-
positors and creditors. In the order levying the said assess-
ment the said Court ordered and directed John D. Hospelhorn, 
Deputy Bank Commissioner and Receiver, to demand and col-
lect from the stockholders severally the sum of $10.00 per 
share for each and every share held by them, "and (failing 
compliance) to take and institute such proceedings and suits 
against any and all parties liable as may be advisable and 
necessary.'' ( See certified copy of Order of Court.) 
Subsequent to the acquisition of the said 100 shares of the 
capital stock of The Baltimore Trust Company by Charles S. 
Corbin, and prior to the insolvency of the said banking in-
stitution, the said Bank passed and declared five dividends 
to its stockholders, the same having been declared and issued 
on June 30, 1930, September 30, 1930, December 31, 1930, 
March 31, 1931, and June 30, 1931. In each of the said in-
stances, dividend checks of the said The Baltimore Trust Com-
pany were issued to Charles S. Corbin for his distributive 
share in the said dividends and were by him accepted and 
paid by the said banking institution. 
After the insolvency of The Baltimore Trust Company and 
the levying of the assessment hereinbefore mentioned, at least 
five written demands for the statutory liability herein in-
volved were made upon the said Charles S. Corbin by the 
said plaintiffs, but the said defendant has failed to pay the 
same or to cause any payment to be made on account thereof, 
said claim being in the amount of $1,000.00 with interest from 
November 13, 1935, at the rate of 6% per annum. 
Upon failure of the defendant, Charles S. Corbin, to pay 
the stockholders' statutory liability herein mentioned, the 
plaintiffs, John D. Hospelhorn and William F. Ayres, Ancil-
lary Receivers of the Baltimore Trust Company, appointed 
by the Circuit Court for Northampton County, Virginia, on 
July 8, 1940, instituted this aetion in the said Circuit Court for 
Northampton County, Virginia, at the September term, 1940, 
thereof. 
4* 
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176 Md. 567; Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U. S. 217, 57 S. Ct. 
151, 81 L. Ed. 133. 
Rinehart v. Wilfong, 1 S. E. 2nd 174 (W. Va.), holds that 
the statute of limitations commences to run from the time 
that an assessment of that liability is laid, and the court ap-
plied the five-years statute of limitations. 
Pyles v. Garney, 101 S. E. 174, 85 W. Va. 159, holds that in 
an action by the bank receiver against the stockholder of 
the insolvent bank, the statute of limitations does not begin 
to run against the enforcement of the assessment until the 
necessihT for payment is nseert.ained, and the court applied the 
five-years statute of limitations to the right of action. 
Sterling, Receiver of the Central Trust Company of Mary-
land v. Beecher, 176 Md. 567, holds that the limitation statute 
begins to run from the date of the assessment. 
Section 5404 of the vVest Virginia Code is the same as sec-
tion 5818 of the Code of Virginia. 
West Virginia Code, section 5404-'' Every personal action, 
for which no limitation is otherwise pres,cribed, shall be 
brought :five years next nftor the right to bring the same 
shall have accrued, if it be for a matter of such nature that, 
in case a par,ty dies, it can be brought"by or against his repre-
sentative; and if it be for a matter not of such nature, shall 
be brought within one year next after the right to bring the 
same shall have accrued, and not after.'' 
,Virginia Code, section 5818-' 'Every personal action, for 
which no limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought 
within five years next after the right to bring the same shall 
have accrued, if it be for a matter of such nature that in· case 
a party die it can be brought by or against his representative; 
and, if it be for a matter not of such nature, shall be brought 
within one year next after the right to bring the same shall 
have accrued.'' 
*West Virginia has a code section 5398 similar to ~he 
6*' Virginia Code section 5810. 
·west Virginia Code, section 5398-"Limitation of Per-
sonal Actions Generally.-Every action to recover money, 
which is founded upon an award, or on any contract other 
than a judgment or recognizance, shall he brought within the 
following number of yea rs next after the right to bring the 
same shall have accrued, that is to say: If the case be upon 
an indemnifying bond taken under any statute, or upon a bond 
of an executor, administrator or guardian, curator, commit-
tee, sheriff or deputy sheriff, clerk or deputy clerk, or any 
other :fiduciary or public officer, within ten years; if it be 
upon any other contract in writing under seal, within ten 
years; if it be upon an mvard, or 'Upon a contract in writing, 
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signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by his agent~ 
bwt not u111iler seal, within ten 11ears; and if it be itpon {1/J'I/Y 
other contract, express or implied, within five years, unless 
it be an action by one party against his copartner for a set-
tlement of the partnership accounts, or upon accounts con-
cerning the trade or merchandise between merchant and mer-
c.hant, their factors or servants, where the action of account 
would lie, in either of which cases the action may be brought 
until the expiration of five years from a cessation of the deal-
ings in which they are interested together, but not after.'' 
( Italics ours.) 
Virginia Code, section 5810-"Limitation of personal 
actions generally.-Every action to recover money which is 
founded upon an award, or on any contract, other than a judg-
ment or recognizance, shall be brought within the fo11owing 
number of years next after the right to bring the same shall 
have first accrued, that is to say: If the case be upon any con-
tract by writing under seal, whether made by a public officer, 
a fiduciary or private person within ten years; if it be itpon 
an award or u.pon a contract in writing signed by the party 
to be charged thereby, or by his agent, bitt not wnder seal, 
within five years; (J!Yl,d if it be 'ltpon any other contract express 
or ·implied ivithin three years, unless it be an action by one 
partner against his co-partner for a settlement of the part-
nership account, or upon accounts concerning the trade of 
merchandise between merc]iant and merchant, their factors, 
or servants, in either of wl1ieh cases the action may be brought 
until the expiration of five years from the cessation of the 
dealings in which they are interested together, but not after 
* * * . " (Italics ours.) 
*Special attention is directed to the italicized por-
7* tions of these two code sec,tions. The wording is almost 
identical except for the number of years. -
We point out also particularly that the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals does not apply section 5398 of the 
West Virginia Code in the bank stockholders' suits, but ap-
plies section 5404 ( old section 4425) in such suits. And West 
Virginia Code, section 5404, is the same as section 5818 of ·the 
Code of Virginia. 
If the three-years statute of limitations of Virginia (section 
5810) is applicable to the instant suit, why should not the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in like suits have 
applied section 5398 of the West Virginia Code? 
If section 5810 (Virginia Code) '' and if it be upon any 
other contract, express or implied within three years'' is ap-
plicable to the instant suit, why isn't section 5398 of the West 
Virginia Code, '' and if it be upon any other contract, express 
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or implied, within five years'', applicable in the suits in the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals? 
Of course, neither of these sections of the codes is ap-
plicable, but the applicable sections are 5404 of the ,vest 
Virginia Code and 5818 of the Virginia Code. 
In the case of M cCZaine v. R(Mikin, 197 U. S. 154, 25 S. Ct. 
410, Chief Justice Fuller held that the ·washington statute 
of limitations similar to section 5818 of the Code of •Virginia 
applied. His opinion f o!lows in part: 
"The following are seetions of the statutes of Washington 
in relation to limitations, as found in Ballinger's Code: 
'' '4798. Within six years.' * *' * 
'' '2. A.n action upon a contract in writing, or liability, 
express or implied, arising out of a written agreement.' * * * 
"'4800. Within three ,Yea.rs:' * * * 
" '3. An action upon a contract or liability, express or ini-
plied, which is not in writi'lig and does not arise out of any 
written instntment.' * •l• * 
8* *" '4805. .An action f a1r relief, not hereinbefore pro-
vided for, shall be coninienced within two years after the 
cause of action shall have accrued.' 
"Reference to the state statutes shows that subd. 2 of #4798 
relates to 'an action upon a contract in writing, or liability, 
express or implied, arising· out of a written agreement'; while 
subd. 3 of #4800 relates to 'an action upon a contract or lia-
bility, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does 
not arise out of any written instrument'. The one relates to 
contracts or liabilities growing out of contracts in writing, 
and the other to contracts or liabilities growing out of con-
tracts not in writing. The receiver's contention is that the case 
falls within subd. 3 of #4800, imposing the limitation of three 
years. If it does not, it is not otherwise provided for, and 
falls within #4805, which fixes the limitation at two years.'' 
".And as this action was commenced within three years, but 
not within two years, after the assessment became due and 
payable, the question is whether subd. 3 of #4800 applies.'' 
* * * 
"Conceding that a. statutory liability may be contractual 
in its nature, or more accurately, quasi-contractual, does it 
follow that an action given by statute should be regarded as 
brought on simple contract, or for breach of a simple con-
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tract, and, therefore, as coming within the provision in ques-
tion ·i • ~ ,!I, " 
''The liability i~ conditional, and statutes of limitation do 
not cmn·mence to run 'u,ntil after a.ssessrnent has been 1nade. 
McDonald v. Thom.pson., 184 U. S. 71, 46 L. Ed. 437, 22 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 297. * «c * '' 
'' Aud, therefore, the question must be met whether this 
is au action brought on a contract 01= not. But it is an action 
to recove t· 011 an nssessment le~ied by the Comptroller of the 
Currency by virtue of the act of Congress, and although the 
shareholder, in taking his shares, subjected himself to tne lia-
bility prescribed by the statute, the question still remains 
whether that liability constituted a contract within the mean-
ing of the statute of limitations of the state of Washington. 
* * * ,, 
"It is true that in particular cases the liability has 
9* been held *to be, in its nature, contractual, yet, it is nev-
ertheless conditional, and enforceable only according to 
the Federal statute, independent of which the cause of ac-
tion does not exist; so that the remedy at law in effect given 
by that statute is subject to the limitations imposed by the 
state statute on such actions'' :j$ * * 
'' But here the right to sue did not obtain until the Comp-
troller of the Currency had acted, and his order was the basis 
of the suit. The statiite of lim.itations did not comrnence to 
nm wntil assessment made, and then, ·it ran as against an ac-
tion to enforce the statutory Uability, and not an action for 
breach of contra.ct. 
• · Vl e think that subd. 3 of #4800 did not apply, and that 
#4805 di<l. '' ( .Italics ours.) 
Section 5810 of the Code of Virginia '' * * * and if it be 
upon any other contract express or implied within three 
vears • • ., ." 
· This Virginia statute is the same as section 4800 (3), su,pra, 
of the state of ·washing-ton, which the United States Supreme 
Court held did not apply to actions of the character under 
consideration. 
Section 5818, Code of Virginia, supra, is the same as sec-
tion 4805, su,vra, of the state of '\Vashington, which Chief ,Jus-
tice :b.,uller held applicable to actions before us. 
The federal statutes imposing· the statutory liability on 
shareholders in national banks were followed by the state of 
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Maryland as will be found in the Maryland Constitution and 
statutes. Compare section 39 of the Constitution, and the 
statutes, article 11, sections 72, et seq., of Maryland, with Re-
vised Statutes, sections 5151, et ~c:eq., U. S. Comp. Statutes 
1901, et seq. 
The Fnite<l States Supreme Court in lf!lcClaine v. Rmikin, 
siepra, had under consideration the same statutory liability 
as the niiaryland statutes impose in the instant case. 
Cable v. Conimercial, etc., Bank, 31 F. Supp. 628, 629, in 
an opinion by District J·udge Paul of the District Court for 
the ·w estem District of Virginia, holds that section 5818 
10* of the Cocfo of Virginia governs the right •Y<of action on 
an assessment on national bank stock. This was an 
action by Cable, receiver of the American National Bank of 
Paris, Texas, against the Uommercial Savings Bank of Win-
chester, Virginia, trustee under the will of Snyder, deceased, 
to recover an assessment made upon stockholders of the 
American National Bank. Judge Paul stated: 
''In the case of Bond, Receiver, v. fVilliam1,son (September, 
1937), this Court held that the liability of a stockholder in a 
national bank wa.s a statutory one and not contractual. Jlf c-
Claine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 25 S. Ct. 410, 49 L. Ed. 702, 
3 Ann. Cas. 500. That the right of action on an assessment 
on such stock waR not one as to which the Virginia law had 
fixed a specific period of limitation and that,. therefore, it 
was governed by the Sect. 5818 of the Virginia Code, provid-
ing that 'Every personal action, for which no limitation is 
otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within five years next 
after the right to bring the same shall have accrued * * * . ' 
See Pyles v. Carney, 85 ,v. Va. 159, 101 S. E. 174; Hall, Rec., 
v. Ballard, 4 Cir., 90 F. 2d 939. The discussion in that case 
need not be repeated here." (Italics ours.) 
In P11les v. Carnev, supra, the receiver sought to enforce 
against the state hank (\V. Va.) stockholders their statutory 
double liability, Hfter the bank had been closed on account 
of insolvency. The court stated: 
"But the court also held that the right to enforce the in-
dividual liability of the stockholders was barred as to all the 
bank's liabilities, on which a rig·ht to sue it had accrued more 
than five years hefore the commencement of this suit. The 
bar of the statute is assigned as one of the grounds of de-
murrer. * * * But the individual liability of a stockl10lder 
to the bank's creditors for an amount equal to t4e par value 
of his stock is not a primary but a secondary liability, being 
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in the nature of a guaranty, and limitation does not begin 
to run against it until the necessity for payment of the same 
is ascertained and the stockholder so notified, which must be 
done within a reasonable time. 3 Michie on Banks & Bank-· 
ing, 881; Flynn v. Bank, 104 Me. 141, 169 .A.tl. 771, 19 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 428, 129 Am. St. Rep. 378; Terry v. Tubman, 
11* *92 U. S. 156, 23 L. Ed. 537; McCla-ine v. ]1ankin, 197 
U. S. 154, 25 Sup. Ct. 410, 49 L. Ed. 702, a· Ann. Cas. 
500; and Long v. Bmtk, 90 N. C. 403. Section 12, chapter 104 
of the Code (sec. 4425), then applies the fi've-year limitation. 
''The bill avers that the bank was closed on July 8, 1913, and 
the present suit was brought in March, 1918, some months 
before the limitation had run. Hence the court erred in re-
spect to the second reason given for sustaining the demurrer'' 
(Italics ours) · 
Section 4425 of the Code of West Virginia is now section 
5404. 
Hall, Rec., v. Balla.rd, 4 Uir. 90 F. 2nd 939, holds that: 
'' For the foregoing reasons, we are impelled to the con-
clusion that in an action by a receiver to enforce the liability 
of a stockholder of an insolvent national bank, whose affairs 
are in the course of judicial administration in a proper pro-
ceeding in the federal court for the purpose of liquidating 
its debts, the liability of the shareholders of the hank does 
not become due, does not mature, and the action to collect 
it does not accrue until the court decides that it is necessarv 
to collect some part of it, determines the amouu't 
and fixes the date for its payment. King v. Pomeroy, supra; 
Rir.lunond v. Irons, suvra; Bcrnheimer v. Converse, supra; 
Williamson v. American Ba;nlc (C. C. A.), 115 F. 793. And 
this result, by analogy, is supported by the following authori-
ties: Deweese v. s,,nith, s-u,pra; Glenn v. Liggett, 135 U. 
533, 10 S. Ct. 867, 34 L. Ed. 262 * * * . 
'' The ref ore, the cause of action against appellee here never 
ace.rued until July 17, 1.934, the date upon which the United 
States District Court for the Wes tern District of Virginia, 
first ascertained the necessity and ordered the payment of 
100 per cent of the par value of the stock and appointed 
Leonard R. Hall receiver, who was ordered and directed on 
that elate to collect the shareholders' liability not to exceed 
$100 for each share owned by them. 
"Counsel for appellee contend, however, that the cause of 
action to enforce the individual liability of the stock-
lla * holders of the Peoples National *accrued on August 22, 
1929, the date on which executions against the Peoples 
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National were returned unsatisfied, that on that date the 
creditors were aware of the insolvency of the bank and the 
consequent liability of its stockholders, and au action could 
have been commenced on that date to enforce such liability, 
and rely for such contention upon the case of Warner v. Citi-
.~ens' Nat. Bank (C. C. A.), 267 F. 661. 
'' It is true that limitations and insolvency transform the 
potential liability of stockholders into one presently enforce-
able. Brown, Jr., v. O'Keefe, 57 S. Ct. 543, 81 L. Ed ..... . 
If the Comptroller of the Currency liquidates the bank, the 
liability is enforceable upon his direction by the suit of the 
receiver, and the cause of action accrues when the Comptroller 
makes the assessment and fixes the time for its payment. If 
the bank is in the course of voluntary liquidation the liability 
is enforceable by a suit in equity in the nature of a creditor's 
bill, and the rig·ht to bring such creditor's bill accrues when in-
solvency becomes manifest. Brown, Jr., v. O'Keefe, supra. But, 
the statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of the 
stockholder upon the insolvency of the bank, except, by 
analogy, as to the suit in equity to determine the amount of 
the liability. The liability of the stockholder is contingent 
upon the amount of the ordinary assets of the bank. * * * 
'' There i~ no question of laches involved in this case and 
even if there were it would have no merit, because the suit in 
equity was broug·ht well within the time fixed by the analogous 
statute and appellee has not shown the existence of any ex-
traordinary circumstances which require the application of 
the doctrine of laches, on the contrary it appears that the 
creditors of the Peoples National were very alert in availing 
themselves of the remedies afforded by the law. * * * The 
statu,te of Umitations of West Virginia and Virl}inia is the 
sa1ne, that of lVest Vfrginia bein,q 55-2-12, West Virginia Code 
of .1931, and of Virginia beiM,g .section 5818, Yir,qinia Code of 
1930, a1td the period is five years. The receiver brought his 
action on the assessment of the stockholders' liability against 
appellee within about a year's time after he had a right to 
bring it. 'J.'hP anwiint of appellee's liability was lGtivfully de-
termined on ~htlJJ .17, 1.934, by the District Court for the West-
em District of V irgi1iia. (Italics ours.) 
llb* *"The act creating the liability of stockholders of 
national hanks fixes no limitation of time for com-
mencing an action to enforce such liability, and there being· 
no other federal statute applicable thereto the statute of limi-
tations of the state where the action was brought govems. 
* ,A\ " Such being· the case here the statute of the state of "\Vest 
Virgfoia is applicable. 
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"In the case of Pyles v. Carney, et al., 85 W. Va. 159, 101 
S. J.i"J. 17 4, the Supreme Court of Appeals of vVest Virginia de-
cided that the vVest Virginia statute applicable to such an 
action is section 12, Article 2, Chapter 55, West Virginia Code 
of 1931, which reads as follows: 
" 'Every personal action for which no limitation is other-
wise prescribed shall be broug·ht within five years next after 
the right to bring· the. same shall have accrued, if it be for a 
matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it can be 
broug·ht by or against his representative.' 
".The action here of appellant against appellee having been 
c011nmenced 1within ft:ve years next after the right to bring the 
same had a,cc,rited it is not barred by the statitte of limita.tions 
of the state of J,V est Virginia." (Italics ours.) 
12"" *vVhat is the nature and classification of the obliga-
tion of a bank stockholder with respect to his liability 
for the statutory assessment 1 The answer to this question 
aids in the determination as to what statutory period of limi-
tations applies. 
'' * ':t' * the liability of a stockholder in a national bank was 
a statutory one and not contractual. McOlaine v. Rankin, 197 
U. S. 154, 25 S. Ct. 410, 49 L. Ed. 702, 3 Ann. Oas. 500.'' ,Judge 
Paul declared in Cable v. Commercial and Savings Bank, 
su,pra,. 
Chief Justice F'uller in McClaine v. Rankin, supra, held that 
the liability of thr stockholder is statutory and not contrac-
tual. 
Sterling, Receiver, etc., v. Reecher, s-u,pra, fully covers the 
nature of tlw stockholder's liability. A portion of the court's 
opinion follows : · 
'' The question in controversy is : Which period of limita-
tions under the Ivfa ryland statutes, three years or twelve years, 
applies to suits to enforce by a receiver the double liability of 
stockholders in trust companies under the provisions of the 
Code, Article 11, Section 72, in force prior to 1937? The Cen-
tral Trust Company's' stockholders were not relieved of that 
liability by the Act of 1937, Chapter 81, Code, Article 11, Sec-
tion 72 A; their liability had been previously established. The 
statute imposing it contained no express limitation on the suit, 
sucl1 as is found in statutes in some other jurisdictions. * 1# * 
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''The appellants pleaded that the cause of action did not 
accrue, within three years before the institution of the suit, 
the period of limitations under the Code, Article 57, Section 
l, for actions of asswmpsit and debt on simple contracts ; and 
the reeeiver. contending· that the suit was upon a statute, a 
specialty under the law, the period of limitations for which 
is twelve years under Section 3 of the Article, demurred to 
the plea. 'rhe demurrer was overruled, and judgment entered 
for the defendants on the pleadings; and the receiver has ap-
pealed. Section 3 provides that, 'No bill testamentary, ad-
ministration or other bond ( except sheriffs' and constables' 
bonds), judgment, recognizance, statute merchant, or of 
13* staple or other specialty *whatsoever, except such as 
shall be taken for the use of the State, shall be good and 
pleadable, or admitted in evidence against any person in this 
State after the principal debtor and creditor have both been 
dead twelve years or the debt or thing in action is above 
twelve years' standing.' Code, Art. 57, Sec. 3. 
"Since shortly after the enactment of the English statute 
of limitations on actions, 21 James I, Chapter 16, suits 
grounded on statutes have been held to be in debt on records 
of the hig·hest rank, those of Acts of Parliament, and hence 
specialties. Bacon, Abridgement, Limitations of Actions 
(D), 'All instruments under seal, of record, and liabilities im-
pose<l by statute are specialties'. 1 Wood, Limitation of Ac-
tions, 4 Eel., Sec. 29; Angell, Limitations of Actions, 6 Ed., 
Sec. 80. And suits upon them are not within the original Act 
providing the limitation on actions on simple contracts. 'An 
action grounded upon a statute cannot be barred; such as 
debt for an escape,' an action for which was provided by a 
statute of Richard II, ch. 12. 1¥ ard v. Reeder, 2 H. & ]\foH. 
145, 154; French v. 0 'Neale, 2 H. & Mel-I. 401; N ewco11ier v. 
Kefdy, 2 Md. 19. But the element of contract in a subscrip-
tion to stock upon which the statute of Maryland lays the 
double liability, has produced uncertainty in the classification 
of suits to recover it. Are they grounded on contract or on 
the statute? 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, Sec. 19. 'The 
liability is wholly 8tatutory, and its definition must be found 
in the words of the statute creating it.' Robinson v. Il ospel-
hon,.1 169 .Md. 117~ 131. But the question now is one of the 
remedy rather than of the origin or nature of the liability. 
"It has been held g·enerally that when the statute creating 
a liability provideR the remedy and allows no other, then the 
remedy could be only that provided, but it would be grounded 
on tl1e statute, necessarily, but that a common law action of 
debt mig·I1t lie either when such an action is given by the stat-
ute or when the statute provides for the payment of a sum of 
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money but does not mention any mode of recovering it. 
1.4* Browne, Actions at Law (45 Law •Lib.) 347; Comyns, 
Dig. ·Actions Upon Statute,' (C) and 'Temps,' (G. 15).; 
l ·wood, Limitation of Actions, Sec. 2H. And see llfotters v.' 
Gunningha,m, 148 Md. 309. Possibly this statement might be 
broadened. What a statute has provided i.s a question of its 
intention, ascertained from express terms or by implication. 
And if the Maryland statute could be said to have intended 
merely that there should be a new plaintiff for an old action, 
previously open to creditors, there is room for an argument 
that a common law action has been continued, and it might 
be a misinterpretation of the statute to hold that it has pro-
vided an exclusive remedy, and that the suit must be con-
sidered one on the statute. Corning v. McCullough, 1 Comst. 
(N. Y.) 47; Stockholders v. Sterling, 300 U. S. 175; Shepherd 
v. Hills (1855), 11 Exch. 55; Goody v. Penny, 9 M. & W. 621, 
affirmed 8 M. & W. 901; Aylott v. West Ilam, Corp. (1926), 
95 L. J. Ch. 533. 
'•But the Maryland statute has, as stated, now provided 
an exclusive remedy; it has not continued an old one, or al-
lowed its continuance. By the Act of 1904, Chapter 101, the 
remedy was taken from the hands of creditors and placed in 
tho8e of a receiver. 'The new law made the receiver, repre-
senting the interests of the corporation, as well as all its 
creditors, the proper party to initiate proceedings against all 
the stockholders for the enforcement of their statuton- lia-
bility.' Gh-in,qher v. Badi.tell, 169 .Md. 678, 686. And by the 
later Act of 1910, Chapter 101, in a coalescence of the stat-
utes concerning the liability of stockholders in trust companies 
and that of stockholders in banks, not only was the remedy 
for enforcement ttgainst both still exclusively that in the hands 
of the receiver, but the liability itself was placed on a new 
foundation. Previously to these statutes a fiction of contract 
between stockholder and creditor was used to rest on existing 
legal theory a sJ1it by the creditor directly against the stock-
lwlder, but now that basis was abandoned; a liability to the 
bank or company directly was substituted; and stockholders, 
not of the date of contracting· debts, but of. the date of receiv-
ership, were subjected to it. Ghin,Qher v. Bachtell, S'U,pra,. The 
analyses of the statutes in the opinions in Robinson v. 
15• II nspelhorn and Ghin.gher v. Bachtell, supra, are ample, 
and *n()ecl not be repeated. They seem to the Court to 
lemye no tloubt tlrn.t the remedy for the liability is now purely 
statutory, and the only right of action that on a specialty. 
See Cork & Bandon Ry. Co. v. Goode, 13 C. B. 826, and Han-
'11-1Hn v. West Chester, 63 Pa. 475. A question whether the 
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judicial ascertainment on October 24, 1932, of the amount of 
the liabiUty to be demanded, taken as a ground of suit against 
the stockhoJdcrs, is a specialty, need not be discussed. Mat-
tore v. Oumningham, 148 Md. 309; Marshall v. Marshall, 164 
Md. 107, 116; Robinson v. Hospelhorn, supra., page 136; Glenn 
v. TVilli(l,ms, 60 Md. 93. The limitation of twelve years under 
Section 3 of Article 57 is found to apply for- the reasons 
stated. 
'' e.Tudgment reversed and new trial awarded, with costs.'' 
Judge Parker, in his opinion in Briley v. Croiwh, 115 F. 
2nd 444, says : 
'' The pertinent sections of the limitation statute relied on, 
sec. 441 of the Consolidated Statutes of North Carolina, are 
as £ollows : 
" '441. Three years. Within- three years an action-
" '1. Upon a contract, obligation or liability arising- out of 
a contract, f·xpress or implied, except those mentioned in the 
precediug sections. 
'' '2. Upon a liability created by statute, other than a pen-
alty or forfeiture, unless some other time is mentioned in the 
statute creating it.' 
"We think that there can be no question but that the pro-
vision applicable is subsection 2 above quoted. While it is 
true, as this Court said in Chisholm v. Gilnier, 4 Cir., 81 F. 
2d 120, that the original liability of a stockholder of a national 
bank is {lontractnal in nature, being based upon his original 
stock subscription, it is clear tha.t his liability under a stock 
assessment fixing the amoimt of the liability is stafotory and 
not contractual in nature. The contract of the stockholder, it 
is true, furnishes the basis upon which the statute op-
16* erates; but it is the Rtatute that fixes *the liability, and 
it is action by the comptroller under the statute that 
fixes the amount thereof. Directly in point is ll1cClaine v. 
B.(J/Yl,kin, 197 F. S. 154. 25 S. Ct. 410, 412, 49 L. Ed. 702, 3 .Ann. 
Oas. 500. That case involved a suit on an assessment of stock 
in a national bank. The statute of limitations was pleaded, 
and the question was whether the section applicable was sec-
tion 4800 of the ,vashingfon Statutes, which provided a limi-
tation period of three yea rs for an action upon contract, or 
section 4805. which provided a limitation period of two yearR 
for actions not otherwise provided for including statutory 
liability. In holding that the latter was the section applicable, 
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tbe Court said: 'Some statutes imposing individual liability 
are merely in affirmation of the common law, while others im-
pose an individual liability other than that at common law. 
1.f ;tt:5151 had provided that subscribing to stock or taking 
shares of stock amounted to a promise directly to every 
creditor, then that liability would have been a liability by 
c,mtract. But the words of #5151 do not mean that the stock-
hc:lder promises the creditor, as surety for the debts of the 
corporation, but merely impose a liability on him as secondary 
to those deLts, which debts remain distinct, and to which the 
stockholder is not a party. The liability is a consequence of 
the breach by the corporation of its contract to pay, and is 
collateral and statutory. * * * It is true that in particular 
cases the liabiJity has been held to be, in its nature, contractual, 
yet, it is nevertheless conditional, and enforceable only ac.._ 
cording to the Federal statute, independent of which the 
cause of action does not exist; so that the remedy at law in 
effect given by that statute is subject to the limitations im-
posed hy the state statute on such actions. {,{, * • But here the 
right to sue did not obtain until the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency had acted, and his order was the basis of the suit. 'fhe 
statute of limitations did not commence to run until assess-
ment made, and then it ran as against an action to enforce 
the statutory liability, and not an action for breach of con-
trRCt.' " (Italics ours.) 
The Carolina statute 441 (1), sitpra, similar to the Virginia 
three-years statute of limitations was held by Judge Parker 
not to be applicable. 
l 7* *If there is anv doubt as to which of the two statutes 
of limitations applies, doubt must be resolved in favor 
of the longest period. Scovill v. Johnson, 3 S. E. 2nd, 543, 190 
s. c. 457. 
There was doubt in the minds of the attornevs for defend-
ant Corbin when they filed the three-years and fi~e-years pleas 
of the statute of limitations. They did not know which was 
applicable. 
It should be pointed out that in Morrow v. Vaughan-Bas-
sett Purniture Conipany, S'lt-pra, suit was brought upon the 
decree of the Texas court levying the assessment. The suit 
was brought on the Texas court's decree of assessment, not 
on the liability of the policyholder's liability to assessment. 
The Texas court by its decree fixed the liability, so that the 
suit is upon the decree of the Texas court, and action upon 
the decree "i·endered in any other state" is not barred for 
ten years from the date of the decree. 
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Section 5819 of the Code of Virgi.nia. '' Every action upon 
a judgment or decree rendered in any other state or country 
shall be barred, if by the laws of such state or country such 
action would be barred, and the judgment or decree be in-
capable of being otherwise enforc~d there; and whether so 
barred or not, no action ag·ainst a person who shall have re-
sided in this state during the ten years next preceding such 
action, shall be brought upon any such judgment or decree, 
rendered more than ten years before the commencement of 
such action.'' 
It follows that the action upon the Baltimore court's decree 
of November 13, 1935, in the instant case, is not barred for 
ten year~ from that date. The laws of Maryland do not bar 
action on this decree, and such decree is not incapable of be-
ing enforced in that state. Sterling, Receiver of Centrat 
Trust Company of JJ1aryla41,d, v. Reecher, supra. 
The defendant, Corbin, has resided in Virginia during the 
ten years preceding this action. 
Petitioners contend that the three-years statute of limita-
tions of Virginia does not apply; that the right of action 
18* accrued on November 13, *1935, the date the Baltimore 
court levied the assessment, and the date from which 
the statute of limitations begins to run; and since this suit 
was brought in September, 1940, within five years or 
ten years from N ovemher 13, 1935, this action is not barred; 
and that the lower court committed reversible error in sus-
taining the three-years statute of limitations plea. 
CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioners respectfully contend and submit that the 
jud~ment of the lower court in this case should be reversed, 
and that this Court should enter judgment in favor of your 
petitioners for $1,000.00 and interest, for the foregoing rea-
sons assigned as well as for others appeariug on the face of 
the record, and respectfully pray that they be awarded a writ 
of error from, and supersedeas to, the judg·ment complained 
of, pending the review of the record by this Court; that this 
petition for writ of error may be read in addition, as your 
petitioners' opening brief, for which said petitioners intend 
it; and that your petitioners may have such further relief in 
the premises as may be proper. 
A copy of this petition was mailed on the 31st day of May, 
1941, to Messrs. L. H. Mears, Benjamin W. Mears and H. H. 
Adams, at Eastville, Virginia, who were the attorneys ap-
pearing for the defendant in the trial of this case before the 
Circuit Court of Northampton County, Virginia. 
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This petition will be filed with Justice C. Vernon Spratley 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Counsel for your petitioners desire to state orally the rea-
sons for reviewing· the judgment and action of the lower court 
hereinabove complained of. 
Attached to and made a part of this petition and opening 
brief is a subject index and table of citations with cases al-
phabetically arranged. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN D. HOSPELHORN, 
WILLIAM F. AYRES, 
JOHN D. HOSPELHORN, and 
.WILLIAM F. AYRES, 
Ancillary Receivers of the Baltimore 
Trust Company, etc., 
By Counsel. 
19* *W. A. DICKINSON, 
vVl\L :E'. AYRES, 
Counsel for Petitioners. 
We, the undersigned attorneys, of Cape Charles, Virginia, 
duly qualified to practice before the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, do certify that in our opinion the judgment 
complained of in the foregoing petition is erroneous and 
should be reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under our hands this the 31st day of May, 1941. 
Received June 3, 1941. 
Reeived June 23, 1941. 
WM. F. AYRES, 
"\V. A. DICKINSON. 
C. V. S. 
Writ of error granted. Bond $300.00. 
c. v. s. 
July 25, 1941. 
Received .T uly 25, 1941. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
In the Circuit Court of Northampton County, Virginia. 
John D. Hospelhorn and William F. Ayres, Ancillary Re-
ceivers of the Baltimore Trust Company, a corporation or-
ganized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the 
State of Maryland, 
v. 
Charles S. Corbin. 
VIRGINIA: 
PLEAS before the Circuit Court of the County of North-
ampton, on the 13th day of March, 1941. 
HE I'r REMEl\IBERED, that heretofore, to-wit: on the 
26th day of August, 1940, came J·ohn D. Hospelhorn and Wil-
liam F. Ayres, Ancillary Receivers, etc., and :filed in the 
Clerk's Office of this Court, their Notice of Motion for J udg-
ment ag·uinst Charles S. Corbin, which is in the following 
words and figures, to-wit: 
To : Charles S. Corbin: 
You are hereby notified that on the 9th day of September, 
1940, between the hours of 10 o'clock A. M:. and 5 o'clock 
P. M. of that day, or as soon thereafter as they may be heard, 
the undersigned, John D. Hospelhorn and ,vmiam F. Ayres, 
Ancillary Receivers of th~ Baltimore Trust Company, a cor-
poration orp;anized and existing under and by virtue of the 
laws of the State of Maryland, will mo':e the Circuit Court 
of Northampton County, at Eastville, Virginia, for a judg-
ment against you in the sum of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) with interest thereon from the 13th day of No-
vember, 1933, until paid, together with tbe costs incident to 
this suit: all of which is justly due from you to the under-
signed ancillary receivers as aforesaid, upon your liability 
as stockholder of said Baltimore Trust Company as the owner 
of certain i;hares of stock of said Baltimore Trust Company 
as follows: 
Date of Issuance 
5/15/30 
5/20/30 
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page 2 ~ For that ou the 5th day of January, 1935, John J. 
Ghingher, the Bank Commissioner of the State of 
l\faryland, pursuant to Section 9 of Article 11 of the Code 
of Public General Laws of Maryland obtained the written con-
sent of the Governor and the A.ttornev General to take forth-
with possession of the property and business of The Baltimore 
Trust Company, a banking and trust company duly incor-
pornted under the law .. s of the State of Maryland; and the 
isaid .Tobu J. Ghing·her, as Bank Commissioner, thereupon ac-
cordingly took possession of the property, assets, and busi-
ll()SS of said Company, and thereupon, on the same day, a suit 
was instituted in the name of the State of Maryland against 
the said The Baltimore Trust Company in the Circuit Court 
No. 2 of Baltimore City for the purpose of having said Court 
assume jurisdiction over the property and business of said 
institution for liquidation; and on the same day the Bank 
Uommissioner, as authorized by law, substituted John D. Hos-
pelhorn, Deputy Bank Commissioner, as Receiver of the 
said institution, and the said Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore 
City, after answer consenting thereto filed by The Baltimore 
Trust Company, appointed the Receiver of The Baltimore 
Trust Company with power and authority to take· charge and 
possession of the books, papers, property, and effects of every 
kind belonging to the said The Baltimore Trust Company, 
and to collerJt the outstanding debts due to said institution, 
and to employ all necessary clerical or other assistance in 
the performance of his duties as Receiver, and thereupon 
John D. Hospelhorn duly qualified as such Receiver and took 
possession of all the assets of said Company, as appears by 
H duly n.nd propPr certified copy of the decree and order of 
tho court attached hereto and made a part hereof. Subse-
quently, to-wit, on the 13th day of November, 1935, the said 
Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City ordered that said Re-
ceiver ht~, and he was thereby, clothed with full po,ver and 
authority to liquidate all of the assets of The Baltimore Trust 
Company at the time of his appointment; and to collect under 
the direction of said Court the statutory liability 
page 3 ~ of its stockholders; and to make distribution of all 
of the assets of said corporation among the creditors 
t]wreof. Subsequently, to-wit, on the said 13th clay of No-
vember, 1935, the said Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 72 of said Article 11 of 
the Annotated Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, 
passed an ord~r in said receivership proceeding, a certified 
copv whereof is filed herewith as part of this notice of motion 
for ·judgment, whereby it was ordered, adjudged and decreed 
by the saicl Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City that an 
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assessment of Ten Dollars ($10.00) per share on all of the 
capital stock of The Baltimore Trust Company, which said 
stock was and is of the par value of Ten Dollars ($10.00) per 
share, was necessary to meet the statutory liability to its 
creditors, and whereby such assessment was by said decree 
levied and imposed, and whereby the Receiver was author-
ized and directed to demand and collect from the stockhold-
ers severally the sum of Ten Dollars ( $10.00) per share for 
each and every share held by them, and (failing compliance) 
to take and institute such proceedings and suits against any 
and all parties liable as mig·ht be advisable and necessary. 
On the 15th and 20th day of :May, 1930, you, the said Charles 
S. Corbin, were the holder and owner of one hundred shares 
of the capital stock of The Baltimore Trust Company of a 
par value of Ten Dollars ($10.00) .per share, and ever since 
have continued to hold and own, and still hold and own the 
said shares of the par value aforesaid, and therefore you 
are indebied to the ancillary receivers in the sum of One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), with interest and costs as 
aforesaid, and, althoug·b we ha':e duly demanded payment 
thereof from you, nevertheless you have failed and refused 
to pay the same, or any part thereof. 
On the 8th day of July, 1940, by order and decree of the 
Circuit Court of Northampton County, Virginia, the under-
signed, Jolm D. Hospelhorn and William F. Ayres, 
page 4 ~ were appointed Ancillary Receivers of the Baltimore 
Trust Company as aforesaid, and on the 19th day 
of August, HJ40, the said ancillary receivers duly qualified 
and executed their bond as required by the aforesaid order 
and decree, jn the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court for 
Northampton County, Virginia. 
The Baltimore Trust Company is a foreign corporation 
and that the evidences of debt hero sued upon are not taxable 
hereunder in the hands of the undersig11ed Ancillary Re-
ceivers. 
Given under our hands this 20th day of August, 1940. 
Respectfully, 
JOHN D. HOSPELHORN and 
WILLIA1H F. AYRES, 
Ancillary Receivers Baltimore Trust Company. 
,J. PURDON "WRIGHT, 
WM. F. AYRES, 
W. A. DICKINSON, 
By Counsel. 
W. A. DICKINSON, p. q. 
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.bJxhibits tiled with and made a part of the aforesaid notice 
are aR follows, to-wit: 
"State of Maryland 
v. 
The Baltimore Trust Company, a body corporate. 
In the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. In Equity. 
Upon thb aforegoing bill, affidavit and answer, it is this 
5th day of January, in the year Nineteen Hundred and Thirty-
five, by the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, ORDERED 
that John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy Bank Commissioner for 
the State of Maryland, be, and he is hereby named, substituted 
and continued as Receiver for The Baltimore Trust Company, 
a body corporate, with power and authority to take charge 
and possession of the books, papers, property and effects of 
eYery kind belonging to the said The Baltimore Trust Com-
pany, and to collect the op.tstanding debts due to the said in-
stitution, and to employ all necessary clerical or 
page 5 ~ other assistance in tho performance of his duties 
as Receiver that the said The Baltimore Trust Com-
pany, its officers, agents and employees be required to yield 
up and deJiver to the Receiver the books, papers, property 
and effects of every kind belonging to said institution subject 
to the further order of this Court. 
AND it is further ORDERED that the said John D. Hos-
pelhorn, as Receiver be required to give bond to the State 
of Maryland in the penalty of One Hundred Thousand ($100,-
000) with corporate surety to be approved by this Court or 
the Clerk thereof, conditioned for the faithful performance 
of the trust reposed in him by this order, and by the pro-
visions of law or which may be reposed in him by any further 
order or decree that may be passed in the premises. 
The amount of bond shall be increased as and when con-
ditions show a likelihood of cash receipts in excess of said 
amount of $100,000. 
Jan. 10, 1935. 
EUGENE O'DUKNE 
EUGENE O'DUKNE 
On report of Receiver that there arc some $200,000 Cash 
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Trust Assets on hand at time of Receivership let penalty in 
Bond be increased now to $250,000.00. 
State of Maryland, 
City of Baltimore, ss: 
EUGENE O'DUNNE 
EUGENE O'DUNNE 
I, CHARLES A. McNABB, Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 
2 of Baltimore City, do hereby certify that the above is a true 
copy of the original Order of Court passed the 5th day of 
J auuary, 1935, and the 10th January, 1935, now on file in this 
office in the cause therein entitled State of Maryland v. The 
Baltimore Trust Company, a body corporate. 
In Testimony Whereof, I hereto set my hand and affix the 
seal of the said CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2, this 20th day of 
June, A. D. 1940. 
CHAR.LES A. l\foN ABB, Clerk. 
page 6 ~ I, JOSEPH N. ,ULMAN one of the Associate 
Judges of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, 
and by assignment, presiding Juqge of the Circuit Court No. 
2 of Baltimore City, in the Eighth Judicial District of the 
State of Maryland, do hereby certify that CHARLES A. Mc-
NABB, who has given the preceding certificate, was Clerk 
of the said Circuit Court No. 2 at the time of so doing, and 
that his attestation is in due form, and his signature thereto 
1s genuine. 
Given under my band this 20th day of June, A. D., 1940. 
JOSEPH N. ULMAN, 
Associate Judg·e, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City. 
State of Maryland, 
City of Baltimore, Set. 
T, CHARLES A. McNA.BB, Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 
2 of Baltimore City, do hereby certify that the Honorable 
,JOSEPH N. ULMAN, one of the Associate Judges of the 
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, and by assignment, pre-
siding- Judge of said Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, 
who has certified and sig·ned the above attestation, was at the 
time of so doing, Judg·e of the said Court, duly commissioned 
and qualified; and that to all acts done by him in that ca-
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paci:ty, full faith and credit are due and ought to be given; 
and that his signature hereto is genuine. 
IN TESTIMONY "WHEREOF, I hereunto subscribe my 
hand and affix the seal of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Balti-
more City, on this 20th day of June, A. D. 1940. 
CHARLE.S .A. McNABB, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 2 of 
Baltimore City.'' 
ORDER FIXI,NG THE AMOUNT OF STOCKHOLDERS' 
STATUTORY LIABILITY AND 
DIRECTING COLLECTION. 
This Court having set for hearing all questions relating 
to the statutory liability of the stockholders of The Balti-
more Trust Company (a corporation of Maryland) to its credi-
tors; and notices having been duly given, such hearing was 
beg·un on the appointed day and was continued on 
page 7 ~ a number of days thereafter. ·witnesses as to the 
financial condition and deficit of the Trust Com-
pany, were examined and cross examined; and all questions 
of law and fact were fully argued by counsel. 
UPON OONSIDERATION "WHEREOF, the Court (this 
13th day of November, 1935), finds as facts: (first) that the 
liabilities of the Trust Company ( excluding therefrom its 
Guaranty .F,und Certificates) exceed the value of its assets 
by an amount larg·ely in excess of six million two hundred 
and fifty thousand do1lars ($6,250,000.00),-being the par 
value of all its stock; and (second) that an assessment of ten 
dollars ($10.00) per share (being the par value thereof) is 
necessary to meet the statutory liability of the stockholders of 
i-:aid Trust Company to its creditors. 
,;vHEREFORE it is now, this 13th day of November, 1935, 
by Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, ADJUDGED AND 
ORDERED: (first) that an assessment of ten dollars ($10.00) 
per share on all the capital stock of The Baltimore Trust 
Company is necessary to meet the statutory liability to its 
creditors ; and such assessment is liereby levied and imposed; 
and (second) that John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy Bank Com-
missione1· and Receiver herein, be and he is hereby author-
ized and directed to demand and collect from the stockholders 
severally, the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) for each and every 
share held by them; and (failing· compliance) to take and in-
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stitute such proceedings and suits against any and all parties 
liable as may be advisable and necessary. 
State of Maryland, 
City of Baltimore, ss: 
EUGENE O'DUNNE 
EUGENE O'DUNNE 
I, CHARLES A. McNABB, Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 
2 of Baltimore City, do hereby certify that the above is a 
true copy of the original Order of Court passed the 13th day 
of November, 1935, now on file in this office in the cause 
therein entitled State of Maryland v. The Baltimore Trust 
Company, a Body Corporate. 
page 8 ~ In Testimony Whereof, I hereto set my hand and 
affix the seal of the said Circuit Court No. 2, this 
20th day of June, A. D. 1940. 
CHARLES A. McNABB, Clerk 
I~ JOSEPH N. TJLMA'N, one of the Associate Judges of the 
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, and by assignment, pre-
sidin.g Judge of the Circuit Court No. 2 9f Baltimore City, in 
the Eighth Judicial District of the State of :Maryland, do 
hereby certify that CHARLES .A. McNABB, who has g·iven 
the preceding certificate, was Clerk of the said Circuit Court 
No. 2 at the time of so doing, and that his attestation is in 
due form, and his signature thereto is genuine. 
Given under my hand this 20th day of June, A. D., 1940. 
JOSEPH N. ULM.AN, 
Associate Judge, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City. 
State of Maryland, 
City of Baltimore, Set. 
I, CHARLES A. McN .ABB, Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 
2 of Baltimore City, do hereby certify that the Honorable 
,JOSEPH N. ULMAN one of the Associate ,Judges of the 
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, and by assig·nment, pre-
siding ,Judg·e of said Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, 
who has certified and signed the above attestation, was at the 
time of so doing, Judge of the said Court, duly commissioned 
and qualified; and that to all acts done by him in that ca-
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pacity, -full faith and credit are due and ought to be given; 
and that his signature hereto is genuine. 
IN T:BJSTIMONY WHEREOF, I hereunto subscribe my 
hand and affix ·the seal of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Balti-
more City~ on this 20th day of June, A. D. 1940. 
CHARLES A. McNABB, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 2 of 
Baltimore City. 
And on another day, to-wit: January 7, 1941, the 
page 9 ~ defendant filed his two (2) pleas of Statute of Limi-
tations and plea of Res Adji£dicata, which are as 
follows, to-wit: 
'' 'l,he said defendant, by his attorneys, comes and says that 
the supposed cause of action in the notice of motion men-
tioned did not accrue to the said plaintiff at any time within 
three years next before the commencement of this action, in 
manner and form as the said plaintiff hath complained against 
him. And this the said defendant is ready to verify. 
MEARS & MEARS, p. cl.'' 
''The said defendant, by his attorneys, comes and says that 
the supposed cause of action in the notice of motion mentioned 
did not accrue to the said plaintiff at any time within five 
years next before the commencement of this action, in man-
ner and form as the said plaintiff hath complained against 
him. And this the said defendant is ready to verify. 
:MEARS & MEARS, p. d. '' 
The plea of Charles S. Corbin, defendant, to a motion for 
judgment exhibited against him in this court by John D. Hos-
pelhorn and vVilliam F. Ayres, Ancillary Receivers of tl1e 
Baltimore ']~rust Company. 
This defendant comes and says that the plaintiffs ought 
not to have or maintain their action aforesaid against him, 
because 11e says that heretofore, to-wit: on the 29th clay of 
December, 1987, the said John D. Hospelhorn, in his capacity 
as receiver of the Baltimore Trust Company by virtue .of his 
appointment as such receiver by Circuit Court No. 2 of Bal-
timore City, in the State of Maryland, did institute an action 
against this defendant by notice of motion for judgment in 
the Circuit Court of Northampton County, Virg-inia, wherein 
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it was sought to reco~er from this defendant the sum of 
$1,000 and interest on account of an alleged liability therefor 
arising out of the ownership by this defendant of certain 
shares of stock of said Baltimore Trust Company, which is 
the. same alleg·ed liability on which plaintiffs in the notice of 
motion for judgment, to which this is a plea, now 
page 10 ~ seek to recover; and on the 17th day o.f November, 
1938, said former notice of motion for judgment 
came on to he heard before the said Circuit Court of North-
ampton County and examination of witnesses for said plain-
tiff and for this defendant were had and taken, and the said 
court after a full hearing thereof entered an order in said 
cause on the 23rd day of December, 1938, dismissing said 
former motion for judgment and ordering said plaintiff to 
pay to this clef endant his costs by him about his defence in 
that behalf expended; and on another day, to-wit: on the 
12th day of April, 1939, the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia entered an order affirming the judgment of said 
Circuit Court of Northampton County, Virginia, and denying· 
to said plaintiff his petition for a writ of error; and on an-
other day, to-wit: on the 9th day of October, 1939, the Su-
preme Couri of the United States entered an order affirming 
the judgment of said Circuit Court of Northampton County, 
Virginia, and denying to said plaintiff his petition for a writ 
of certiorari; all which matters and things this defendant doth 
aver and plead in bar to the present said motion for judg-
ment, wherefore this defendant prays judgment of this hon-
orable court whether he shall be compelled to make any fur-
ther defence to said motion for judgment, and prays thence 
to be dismissed with his reasonable costs in this behalf sus-
tained. 
CHARLES S. CORBIN. 
By MEARS & ME·ARS, Counsel. 
MEARS & MEARS, Counsel.'' 
And on another day, to-wit: March 13, 1941, the Court en-
tered the following· order: 
''This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and the de-
fendant, having· on January 7th, last, tendered in writing his 
three-year and five-year plea of the Statute of Limitations 
and a plea of res ad.iudicata, all of which were this day re-
ceived and filed. Thereupon, the plaintiff, by coun-
page 11 }· sel, moved the Court to reject all of said pleas, 
which said motion was overruled by the Court as 
to the pleas of the Statute of Limitations, but the motion to 
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reject the plea of res adjitdicata was not passed upon, to which 
ruling of the Court in refusing to reject the pleas of the Stat-
ute of Limitation, the plaintiffs excepted. And thereupon, 
the plaintiffs replied generally to the pleas of the Statute of 
Limitation and joined issue. And, by consent of counsel .of 
all of the parties, the Court proceeded to hear and determine 
the cause without the intervention of a Jury; and by further 
consent of all parties, by counsel, the record and evidence of 
the action of the Baltirnore '1.1rust Co11ipa,ny Receiver v. 
Charles B. Corbin, formerly tried in this Court, was tendered 
as evidence in this case, which was all the evidence heard by 
the Court. And after argument of counsel the Court doth find 
that the three-year period of the Statute of Limitation is ap-
plicable to this action. Thereupon, it is considered by the 
Court that this cause be dismissed and that the defendant re-
cover of the plaintiffs his costs by him about his defense in 
this behalf expended, to which ruling of the Court plaintiff 
excepted. 
Thereupon, the plaintiffs moved the Court to set aside the 
aforesaid judgment and grant them a new trial on the grounds 
that the same is contrary to the law and the evidence; which 
motion being fully argued by counsel was overruled by the 
Court; to which ruling of the Court the plaintiff excepted. 
MEMO :-The plaintiffs representing to the Court that 
they are ag·g-rie-v-ed by the aforesaid judgment and desire to 
present a petition to t:µe Supreme Court of Appeals for a 
Writ of Error, it is ordered that execution upon said judg-
meut he suspended for a period of sixty ( 60) days from the 
date hereof, provided the said plaintiffs, or some one for 
them, enter into a bond before this Court, or its Clerk in his 
office, iu the penalty of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS 
($250.00), conditioned according to law, with surety deemed 
sufficient by this Court, or its Clerk in vacation.'' 
page 12 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Northampton County. 
John D. Hospelhorn ancl William F. Ayres, Ancillary Re-
ceivers of the Baltimore Trust Company, a Corporation 
Organized and Existing Under and by Virtue of the Laws 
of tLe State of Maryland, 
v. 
Charles S. Corbin. · · 
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Grover L. Michael. 
BILLS OF EXCEPTION AND CERTIFICATE. 
The followin,g evidence, testimony, exhibits, and incidents 
of the trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs and defendant, as here-
inafter denoted, is all the evidence, testimony, and exhibits 
introduced on the trial of this cause before the Judge of this 
court, a jury having· been waived by consent of said plain-
tiffs and defendant: 
GROVER L. MICHAEL, 
a witness of lawful age, produced on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
having been first duly sworn according to law, was examined, 
and testified as follows : 
"That he is forty-one years of age and a resident of Fred-
erick, Maryland. He is employed as Receiver's Representa-
tive of The Baltimore Trust Company having been appointed 
to that office by John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy Bank Com-
missioner and Receiver of The Baltimore Trust Company 
with the approval of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore 
City by order dated March 25, 1935." A photostatic copy of 
said order was then introduced in evidence, marked plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. l and authenticated by the Judge for the pur-
pose of making· same a part of the record in this cause, and 
reads as follows: 
State of :Maryland 
v. 
The Baltimore Trust Company, a body corporate. 
In the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, 
ORDER.. 
The aforep:oinµ; petition having been read and considered, 
it is this 25th day of November, 1935, by Circuit Court No. 2 
of Baltimore City, 
ORDERED that. Grover L. Michael, Esquire, be and he is 
hereby appointed Transfer Agent for Certificates of Indebt-
edness issued by The Baltimore Trust Company, in the place 
of H. Steuart Jackson, resigned, this appointment to be ef-
fective on and after November 22, 1935. 
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AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the duties of said 
Transfer Agent shall be performed by the said Grover L. 
Michael in connection with the duties now being discharged 
by him as the assistant of John D. Hospelhorn, Receiver of 
The Baltimore Trust Company, without any increase of sal-
ary therefor. 
EUGENE O 'DUNNE. 
State of Maryland, 
City of Baltimore, ss: 
I, John Pleasants, Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Bal-
timore City, do hereby certify that the above is a true copy 
of the original order of Court signed the 25th day of No-
vember, 1935, now on file in this office in the cause therein. 
In Testimony Whereof, I hereto set my hand and affix 
the seal of said Circuit Court No. 2, this 19th day of :May, 
A. D., 1937. 
JOHN PLEASANTS, Clerk. 
page 14 ~ ''That the plaintiff, .John D. Hospelhorn is 
Deputy Bank Commissioner of the State of Mary-
land and was substituted as Receiver of The Baltimore Trust 
Company by the then Bank Commissioner of Maryland, said 
appointment and substitution having been confirmed by the 
Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City by order dated Janu-
ary 5th, 1935." A photostatic copy of said order was then 
introduced in evidence, marked plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 and 
authenticated by the Judge for the purpose of making same 
a part of the record in this cause, and reads as follows: 
In the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. In Equity. 
State of Maryland 
V. 
The Baltimore Trust Company, a body corporate. 
Upon the aforegoing, bill, affidavit and answer, it is this 
5th day of January, in the year Nineteen Hundred and Thirty-
five, by the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, OR-
DERED that John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy Bank Commis-
sioner for the State of Maryland, be, and he is hereby named, 
substituted and continued as Receiver for The Baltimore 
Trust Company, a body corporate, with power and authority 
John D. Hospelhorn, et al., v. Charles S. Corbin. 31 
to take charge and possession of tbe books, papers, property 
and effects of every kind belonging· to the said The Baltimore 
Trust Company, and to collect the outstanding debts due the 
said institution, and to employ all necessary clerical or other 
assistance in the performance of his duties as Receiver that 
the said The Baltimore Trust Company, its officers, agents 
and employees be required to yield up and deliver to the Re-
ceiver the books, papers, property and effects of every kind 
belonging· to said institution subject to the further order of 
this Court. 
AND it is further ORDERED that the said John D. Hos· 
pelhorn, as Receiver be required to give bond to the State 
of Maryland to the penalty of One Hundred Thousand ($100,-
000.) with corporate surety to be approved by this 
page 15 ~ Court or the Clerk thereof, conditioned for the 
faithful performance of the trust reposed in him 
by this order, and by the provisions of law or which may be 
reposed in him by any further order or decree that may be 
passed in the premises. 
The amount of bond shall be increased as and when condi-
tions show a likelihood of cash receipts in excess of said 
amount of $100,000. 
EUGENE O'DUNNE. 
Jan. 10, 1935. 
On report of Receiver that there are some $200,000. Cash 
Trust Assets on hand at time of Receivership let penalty in 
Bond be increased now to $250,000.00. 
EUGENE O'DUNNE. 
State of Maryland, 
City of Baltimore, ss : 
I, John Pleasants, Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Bal-
timore City, do hereby certify that the above is a true copy 
of the original order of Court signed the 5th day of January, 
1935, now on file in this office in the cause therein and I fur-
ther certify that the bond has been :filed as per terms of said 
Order. 
In Testimony Whereof, I hereto set my hand and affix the 
seal of said Circuit Court No. 2, this 21st day of January, 
A. D., 19:37. 
JDHN PLEASANT.S, Clerk. 
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'' That qn February 25, 1933, by executiv.e proclamation of 
the Governor of the State of Maryland a banking holiday 
was declared within the said State and was continued there-
after from day to day until March 6th, 1933, at which time 
the Presi<lential proclamation of the President of the United 
States declared a National banking holiday. That 
page 16 ~ during the said National banking holiday at a Spe-
. · cial Session of the Legislature of the State of 
l\faryland the Emergency Banking Act was passed effecting 
all of the banks in the State of Maryland, their stockholders 
and depositors. That under the terms of the said Emergency 
Banking Act t.he custody and control of The Baltimore Trust 
Company was vested in the then Bank Commissioner of Mary-
la~d and continued in the custody of the Bank Commissioner 
until January 5th, 1935, at which time, in pursuance of the 
statutory law of Maryland, the then Bank Commissioner 
posted a notice on the door of the said bank to the effect that 
the said banking institution was in his custody as Receiver; 
that on the same day, in pursuance of the statutory law of 
the State of Maryland a suit was instituted by John J. 
Ghingher, Bank Commissioner, in the name of the State of 
:Maryland, against The Baltimore Trust Company in the Cir-
cuit Court ~ o. 2 of Baltimore City for the purpose of having 
the said Court assume jurisdiction over the property and 
estate of the said banking institution, and for the further 
purpose of having the said Court approve the substitution 
of John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy Bank Commissioner as Re-
ceiver of The Baltimore Trust Company, That thereafter, on 
November 18th, 1935, the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore 
City, acting in pursuance of the constitutional and statutory 
provisions of the State of Maryland assessed the stockhold-
ers of the said bank $10.00 per share for each and every share 
of stock held by them and ordered the said John D. Hospel-
horn, Deputy Bank Commissioner and Receiver of T\ie Bal-
timore Trust Company to collect the said liability from the 
said stockholders.'' 
"That this action is being brougllt by the said plaintiff in 
pursuance of Article 3, Section 39 of the Constitution of the 
State of Marvland and Section 72 of Article 11 of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland in conformity with the order of the 
Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City dated November 13, 
1935.'' A certified copy of said order was then introduced 
in evidence, marked plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 and authenti-
cated by the Judge for the purpose of making- same a part of 
the record in this cause, and reads as follows: 
John D. Hospelhorn, et al., v. Charles S. Corbin. 33 
page 17 }- In the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City. 
State of Maryland 
v. 
The Baltimore Trust Company, a body corporate. 
ORDER. FLXING.THE AMOUNT OF STOCKHOLDERS' 
S'r.ATUTORY LIABILITY AND DIRECT-
ING COLLECTION. 
This Court having· set for hearing all questions relating 
to the statutory liability of the stockholders of The Baltimore 
Trust Company ( a corporation of Maryland) to its creditors; 
and notices having been duly given,-such hearing was begun 
on the appointed day and was continued on a number of days 
thereafter. Witnesses as to the financial condition and deficit 
of the Trust Company, were examined and cross examined; 
and all questions of law and fact were fully argued by coun-
sel. 
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, the Court (this 
13th day of November, 1935) finds as facts: (first) that the 
liabilities of the Trust Company ( excluding therefrom its 
Guaranty Fund Certificates) exceed the value of its assets by 
an amount largely in excess of six million two hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars ($6,250,000.00),-being the par value 
of all its stock; and (second) that an assessment of ten dol-
lars ($10.00) per share (being· the par value thereof) is neces-
sary to meet the statutory liability of the stockholders of said 
Trust Company to its creditors. 
WHEREFORE it is now, this 13th day of November, 1935, 
by Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, ADJUDGED AND 
ORDE.RED: (.first) that an assessment of ten dollars ($10.00) 
per share on all the capital stock of The Baltimore Trust 
Company is necessary to meet the statutory liability to its 
creditors; and such assessment is hereby levied and imposed; 
and (second) that John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy Bank Com-
missioner and Receiver herein, be and he is hereby author-
ized and directed to demand and collect from the stockholders 
severally, the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) for each and every 
share held by them ; and ( failing compliance) to 
page 18 ~ take and institute such pl'oceedings and suits 
against any and all parties liable as may be ad-
visable and necessary. 
EUGENE 0'DUNNE. 
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I HEREBY c:m-RTH.,Y, that the aforegoiug is a true copy 
of an order or decree of the Circuit Court .No. 2 of Baltimore 
City passed in the above-entitled cause on the 13th day of 
November, 1935, and in testimony thereof I have hereunto 
subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the said Circuit 
Court No. 2 ;of Baltimore City this 21st day of December, 
1937. 
State of Maryland, 
City of Baltimore, to-wit: 
JOHN PLEASANTS, 
Clerk of Circuit Court No. 2 of 
Baltimore City. 
I, Eugene O'Dunne, Judge of the Circuit Court No. 2 of 
Baltimore City, in the State of Maryland, do certify that 
l ohn Pleasants, whose name is signed to the attached cer-
tificate, to the copy of the proceedings in that certain suit 
style State of Maryland 1;. The Baltimore Trust Company, 
a body corporate, and to the order fixing the amount of stock-
holders statutory liability directing collection, is now, and was 
at the time of signing the said certificate, Clerk of of the Cir-
cuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, in the State of Maryland, 
duly elected and qualified according to law; that his said sig-
nature is genuine; that all of his official acts are entitled to 
full faith and credit; that the attestation of the said John 
Pleasants to the said certificate is in due form of the law; 
that the seal of the Court annexed thereto was duly affixed 
by the said John Pleasants, Clerk as aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this 22nd day of December, 1937. 
EUGENE O'DUNNE, 
Judge of the Circuit Court No. 2, 
Baltimore City. 
State of Maryland, 
page 19 ~ City of Baltimore, to-wit: 
I, John Pleasants, Clerk of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Bal-
timore City, in the State of Maryland, a Court of record, do 
hereby certify that Eugene O'Dunne, whose name is signed 
to the foregoing certificate is now and was at the time of sign-
ing of the said certificate, Judge of the said Circuit Court No. 
2 of Baltimore City, in the State of :Maryland, duly qualified 
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according to law; that his signature is genuine; and that all 
of his official acts a.re entitled to full faith and credit. 
Given under my hand this 22nd day of December, 1937. 
JOHN PLEASANTS, 
Clerk of Circuit Court No. 2 of 
Baltimore City. 
'' That the stock certificates issued to Charles S. Corbin 
were of the exact form except as to name of stockholder, num-
ber of shares of stock and dates, as that certificate issued to 
.Louise J. Notting·ham." Said certificate of stock was in-
troduced in evidence by the defendant, marked Exhibit A, 
and is authenticated. by the Judge for the purpose of mak-
ing it a part of the record in this cause. 
'' 'llhat the stockholders' Assessment Record of The Bal· 
timore Trust Company showed Charles S. Corbin, 1300 Wal-
nut A venue, Rognel Heights, Baltimore, Maryland, was the 
owner of 100 shares of stock of said bank evidenced bv cer-
tificates number 03949 for 50 shares issued on 1\fay 15," 1930, 
and by certificate number 03973 for 50 shares issued on May 
20, 1930. '' Said record was introduced in evidence, marked 
plaintiff's Exhibit 4, and authenticated by the Judge of this 
court for the purpose of making· it a part of the record in 
this cause. 
'' That he has the slips for transfer of said stock to said 
Corbin by request of Paul W. Eichelberger & Company." 
'11hey were introduced in evidence, marked plaintiff's Exhibits 
5 and 6, and authenticated by the Judge of this court for the 
purpose of making them a part of the record in this 
cause. 
page 20 ~ ''That he has the cancelled dividend checks show-
ing payment of five dividends of $40.00 each to said 
Oorbin bv said bank.'' Said checks were introduced in evi-
dence, anv by agreement of counsel photostatic copies were 
substituted, and marked plaintiff's Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10 and 
11, and authenticated by the Judge of this court for the pur-
pose of making them a part of the record in this cause. 
'' That the insolvency of The Baltimore Trust Company 
found by thH Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City still re-
mains, its liabilities exceeding its assets by over $12,00Q,OOO. '' 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
'' That subsequent to the assessment of the statutory lia-
bility upon the stockholders of The Baltimore Trust Com-
pany, a constitutional referendum was submitted, to the 
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voters of the State of Maryland and was approved by the 
vote.rs at the next succeeding general election, the effect of 
which was to repeal the constitutional and statutory liability 
of stockholders in Maryland banks who became such subse-
quent to the date of its passage, provided howe-v-er, the stock 
purchased was a new issue of capital stock, issued subsequent 
to the date of the approval of the said referendum. That 
the statutory double liability of existing stockholders and 
their subseque1~t transferees remained in full force and ef-
fect to the same extent as it was prior to the passage of the 
said referendum, provided, however, that any bank could re-
lieve its existing stockholders of their statutory superadded 
liability by the publication of notice to its depositors for three 
months, adyising the said depositors of the termination of 
the statutory liability of its stockholders three months there-
after provided further that in the latter instance the bank 
or trust company ·would be required to transfer to surplus at 
the close of every fiscal period 10% of its net earnings until 
such surplus shoulrl equal and thereafter to continue to equal 
100% of its capital.'' 
(Testimony of witness concluded.) 
page 21 ~ J.OSEPH G. F,INNERTY, 
a witness of lawful age, produced on behalf of the 
plaintiff, having been first duly sworn according to law, was 
examined, anJ testified as follows: 
'' That ho is a resident of Baltimore City in the State of 
.Maryland. That he is a practicing attorney in the City of Bal-
timore, being a member of the Baltimore City Bar and the 
Maryland State Bar. That he is familiar with the constitu-
tional and statutory laws of the State of Maryland relative 
to the liability of stockholders in banks and trust companies 
of Maryland.'' 
"That he is one of counsel for the Receiver of the Balti-
more Trust Company; that the certified copy of the order 
of Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, entered on Novem-
ber 13, 1935, attached to and made a part of the notice of 
motion for judgment, plaintiff's Exhibit 3, is a true and cor-
rect cop)r of said order and decree.'' 
'' That the Code of Maryland which he has and offers in 
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evidence contained the Constitution and statutes of the State 
of Maryland, and was printed by the authority of the State 
of Maryland.'' The Code was then introduced in evidence 
and read by said witness as follows: 
Article III, 8ection 39 of the Constitution of Maryland 
Article II, Section 72 of the Code of Maryland 
Article II, Section 9 of the Code of Maryland 
Article II, Section 9AA of the Code of Maryland 
Article II, Section 9B of the Code of Maryland 
A1-ticle 23, Section 94 of the Code of Maryland 
Article II, S,3ction 72A of the Code of Maryland 
'' That the statutory liability of stockholders of banks and 
trust companies in the State of Maryland is predicated upon 
a provision in the Constitution of the State of Maryland be-
ing Article III, Section 39, which provides as follows: 
Sect. 39: ''The General Assembly shall grant no charter 
for Banking purposes, nor renew any Banking Cor-
page 2:l r poration now in existence, except upon the condi-
tion that the· stockholders shall be liable to the 
amount of their respective share or shares of stock in such 
Banking .Institution, for all its debts and liabilities upon note, 
bill or otherwise; the books, papers and accounts of all Banks 
shall be open to inspection under such regulations as may be 
prescribed by Law.'' 
"That in pursuance of the said constitutional provision the 
statutory law of Maryland provides in Article II, Section 72 
in the Annotated Code of Maryland as follows: 
72. '' Stockholders of every bank and trust company shall 
be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not 
one for another, for all contracts, debts and engagements of 
every such corporation, to the extent of the amount of their 
stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the 
amount invested in such stock. Persons having stock entered 
on the books of the corporation in their names as executor, 
administrator, guardian, trustee or pledgee, shall not be per-
sonally subject to any liability on such stock, but the one 
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pledging stock, and the estate and funds in hands of such 
executor, administrator, guardian or trustee shall be subject 
to the liability imposed upon the holders of said shares; and 
the liability of such stockholders shall be an asset of the cor-
poration for the benefit ratably of all the depositors and 
creditors of any such corporation, if necessary to pay the 
debts of such corporation, and shall be enforceable only by 
appropriate proceedings by a receiver, assignee or trustee 
of such corporation acting under the orders of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction. Nothing in this section or article shall 
be construed to repeal or affect the existing rights of credi-
tors or liabilities of stockholders of any trust company under 
the existing law at the time of the passage or taking effect of 
this article.' ' 
'' That the statutory law of the State of Maryland referring 
to the winding· up of the affairs of insolvent banking· institu-
tions as contained in Article II, Sections 9, 9AA and 9B of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1935 Supplement, provided 
as follows: 
"Art. II, Sect. 9: "Whenever it shall appear to the Bank 
Commissioner, upon examination, that any banking institu-
tion doing business under this Article is conducting- its busi-
ness in an unsafe or unauthorized manner or in 
page 23 ~ conflict with this article, or if any such institution 
shall refuse to submit its books, papers and con-
cerns to the examination of the Bank Commissioner, or if any 
such institution shall neglect or refuse to observe an order 
of the Bank Commissioner as specified in Section 8 of this 
Article, the Bank Commissioner may if he deems it advisable, 
with the written consent of the Governor and Attornev Gen-
eral, obtained prior hereto, forthwith take possession "of the 
property and business of such institution and shall cause a 
notice to be posted on the front door of the institution as fol-
lows: '' This institution is in the hands of the Bank Com-
missioner.'' 
Art. II, Sect. 9AA: '' On taking possession of the prop-
erty and business of any banking institution under the pro-
visions of Sections 8.A. or 9 of this Article, the Bank Commis-
sioner slmH f orthw·ith give notice of such fact to any and all 
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banks, trust companies, associations and individuals holding 
or in possession of any assets of such institutions and shall 
also cause snch notice to be given by advertisement in such 
newspaper as he may deem necessary. Immediately upon 
the posting of the notice specified in said sections either by 
the Board of Directors or by the Bank Commissioner, the 
property, assets aud business of such institution shall be con-
sidered to be in the possession of the Bank Commissioner, as 
receiver, the same as if he had been appointed by an order 
of court, which fact shall operate as a bar to any and all at-
tachments, liens, executions or distraints of any kind.'' 
Art. II, .Sect. 9B : '' The Bank Commissioner shall, within 
a r~asonable period after taking· possession of any banking 
institution, cause proper proceedings to be instituted in the 
name of the State of Maryland against said institution in a 
court of competent jurisdiction, for the purpose of having 
the court assume jurisdiction over the property and business 
of said institution, for liquidation, and the said Bank Com-
miHsioner shall, within six months after taking possession 
of any hanking institution, file in said Court a complete and 
detailed report as to such banking institution. The Bank 
Com.missioner may s-u,bsWute the Deputy Bank Comrnissioner, 
vr a .~wnior exatn.iner as receiver of such institution, provided 
however, that no such receiver shall receive. any additional 
compewmtion for his services as receiver, but shall be allowed 
clerical, traveling and legal expenses, subject to the Court's 
order, and shall furnish such bond as the Court may re-
quire." ~ ~ * 
'' That in addition to the authority given to the Bank Com-
missioner as Receiver of insolvent banking institu-
page 24 ~ tions, or to tho~e suhRtituted in his place and stead 
as provided in the above referred to statutes, the 
Re<~eiver is g·iven the power and authority of a g·eneral re-
ceiver with tl1e same power and authority conferred upon the 
latter as provided in Article 23, Section 94 of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland, which provides as follows : 
94: "Whenever any corporation shall be dissolved by the 
decree of any court of this State, its property shall vest in 
its receivers appointed and named therein, and all prefer-
ences, paymento and transfers, howsoever made by it or by 
uny of its officers on its behalf which would be void or fraudu-
lent under the provisions of the insolvency laws of this State, 
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if made by a natural person, shall to the like extent and with 
like r,m:,edi~s be fraudulent and void; and for the purpose 
of setting aside such preferences, payments and transfers, 
the receiver 0£ such corporation shall have all the powers 
vested in the permanent trustee of an insolvent debtor and 
the date of the filing of the petition or bill by or against such 
corporation shall, for the purpose of determining the validity 
of preferences and for all other purposes, be treated as the 
date of the filing of the petition in insolvency by or against a 
natural person; provided, however, that if any real or per-
sonal property of t:iuch corporation shall have been decreed 
to be sold by any court of equity for the enforcement of a 
mortgage, deed of trust or deed of trust in the nature of a 
mortgage; or if therE-) be a power of sale or a consent to a de-
cree for u sale contained in any mortgage, deed of trust or 
deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage of real or personal 
property made by such corporation, then (unless with the 
written consent of tbe other parties in interest) the receiver 
of such corporation shall be authorized to sell only the equity 
of r('demption in the property mentioned in such decree, mort-
gag~, deed of tmst or deed of trust in the nature of a mort-
gage, and unless such consent be given such decree and the 
powers of sale contained in such mortgage, deed of trust or 
deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage may be executed 
as if proceedings against the corporation had not been insti-
tuted.'' 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
"That subsequent to the insolvency of The Baltimore Trust 
Company, the Legislature of the State of Maryland submitted 
to the registered voters of the said State a constitutional 
amendment cnlculnted to relieve stockholders of banks and 
trust companies within the State of Maryland of 
page 25 ~ the statutory double liability. That at the next 
succeeding general election the said referendum 
was passed by the voters of the State of Maryland as a result 
of which Chapter 81 of the Acts of 1937 was enacted by the 
State Legislature, the same being codified as Article II, Sec-
tion 72A, which provides as follows : 
72A: '' The individual responsibility imposed by the pro-
visions of Section '72 of this Article upon the stockholders of 
every bank and trust company for all contracts, debts and 
engagements of every such corporation to the extent of the 
' 
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amount of t~eir sto~~ t4erein, at the par. t4ereof, iJ?, a,dcµtion to1th<lambtliit 1inves·t~d1 m' sdid stoc'k, slialf 'iiof'apply witii' 1·e·.! 
sperlt to sto6k' originUlly iis~uei:l by ~ny· Brtiik br th.ist-'coilip)lny 
s~1?,~e9ne1#'t~ ~dy~~iibe\· 2.?:1ia,t1~~W' 11~tl~li1i~~~~?n~i~i_U~f s1?~ll 
~e~s~· ?.1:1 J:'u'y ~s,, 1~.37, ,riW' r~,~P;~t tojl';l~1'. ?nt~tatnil~g ~yoa~ 1~~~~q ~y· 13:~y ·Jjanfr ?r' t~·1sJ 1~~~p
1
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busmess under 1'thd· p11ov1s1ons o'f: this ArfadIEr·uh Jtily''lst~ 
1981fpro"¢rde'g that ~~f l'es!(t~~ii 1t1;ifij~ m?M~s ptior 'to; ~11~4 
date such bank l>r ~rust ~ompatiy' sliall ·lliNM 1cauMe~ ndtic~· of 
~uch prospective term.~natio~ ~{ r~~p.on~iq~\i~y ~o ~~ P~£Hsb~d 
Ill a newspaper pubh1~1i~d · 1'n' the' ·c1.ty, village ot1 do--iirlty1 lil 
which the bank or trust company is located, or if no news-
paper is t~~re puhli~~~d tr,;~n·'i:n'th~Jneafest county seat ~nd 
provided 1fiitthd¥'tiia:tl 1s11dii=1fatlit o'f·trldst 'tfolllpAnf·'srralI 8~1·! 
tify to the Bank Co1nmissidne'i•1rtiie fii&f of nsuch t:r.rri:b116atibn 
unqer the se~l of the Bank or 'r.r.ust Qo:µipa:µy by its f resi-
d~nt I arta C:Mliier blr"T;t~ltsurer. 'lif··an;f 1>~1,ik 9~ :tf1t'st 'c9m-P,a~t :~li~H f~\, {o ~i~r,~ ~~~fr~btic~,'.\y~thill .. :t1Jfoi tl'ihf1 'qtj ~n··t~~ 
ma1iiner above· p:rbv1ded; or· 1shair'fa11' to ~1'vJ'the b1~ttl1ficltte' of 
iucW'publiciatio1{ ifo!• tl\~ 'Bart~1 'b,f>~~issi'.b'#~:t'Jiis: l~nd-<ft ;pr~~ 
vitlJtI,1;the11 t~Hnthdtlohli 0£ ~'iirlh te'spohsibilif I riid 11fli~Yea¥ter 
be· 1tidcompl1s1i~t11\11~ 1 o'r the1lrilte11thi~~:;hioillbs $rit>s'etj_1i'ent !fo 
tlie f'pu.~lic. ~J1.· oif tail~ ~brtiffo. Atio_' n ~k~lie 1ma:_·n_ti.-·tn:; 1-lt1j~dv~··spec.i~ fi~q ;' ~r~~i1e~ i~§~li. p~~~( ~.~ ttu~t ~ ~o~p~~f ~~l ~c10,i~* ~~sin~:s:s 
1foqer ·the 1p1~'Jv1.M10hs'·hf t.h1s1 ~l'ticle' up<lti s~Qb ·qat.e. · Until d) nb.ticti I sµ~ll' ··~ri vd b.een . pul;>lHdi~t1.1 '~~<\! 1 ~ I G~~Wtica t1e, t~erebf ]fas' -1:Men f u, l~nishecr in.1 'a'cbo i·dan~<! ~ li'ertHMili st,uc. m 'tM\-\b. :nsi'bilhy 
s'.nall ·coMinrle iiei-~atfoi- .b.:~ 1ier~thtb~~.H; t'ilt'!, I,.;,,:·, .. :: :IIT : 
·'tn t'he'.1e_· ~efit t>'f l~,i~ tt:!rininil:tib.'il dtif:h~ inqividua_.1 res' po~s_i-. 
bility ·,H the·,~o~qerfbf''flie oiHst~~irlirtg'st~~\r ·9f a:tly 1\~~~'bt 
trust' company ·~¥ · ~b?.f? 1 in~fy~d1~~~n~~~~ g4N(~t· 1th~~~ 1~0.#~ 
pany shall transfer· to· surp'lus 1at ·the11cldse ·of·a· fiscal petioa, 
either aI~l~Ually Or S~mi-a~~n~altf., ¥?t. ,~~S th~f ten :P,~~~ ~ent (10%) of 1ts net earmngs''after 'fmrv'1dmg for ~~penses, losses, 
interest and taxes accru~ng 9r due from s~icl ~~!11~ 
page 26 ~ or trust company, until: sbdh s1irpHis 1sllan equal ;and 
t11~~e~fter ~onti:µue ~o ~qua~ one. µundred pe1~ ce~t (100%) of 1its·ca:bital:''l;,tt· ll'. · t•; :!, ..ill, ' 1 " l,, ,;,:.· ,,,, 
''rJu~t t~~ eff?ct ~f th~ s~~q ~~ction nA ?+ 4r.Fcl~ If ~~s 
to retam tlfo statutorv ·Irnbthtv <>f a'll 'stoekholdet-i, who were 
s~ic~ as·~+ t~~ cWte ?r h~ ~Ei~~ig¢, ~~~ we~r; ~~r,s~9u~~ftr~ns:. 
f erees, 1irtless ancl until the· forttk of wn1ch they are .. sfockhold-
ers complies with the provisions of the said Section. That 
as to the statutory liability of the stockholders of The Bal-
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timore Trust Company the referendum and the subsequently· 
enacted Article II, Section 72A, is not effective nor does it 
bar the right of the plaintiff, John D. Hospelhorn, Deputy 
Bank Commissioner and Receiver of The Baltimore Trust 
Company from proceeding against the registered owners of 
the capital stock of The Baltimore Trust Company for the 
double liability due from them under the constitutional and 
statutory provisions of the State of Maryland.'' 
(Testimony of the witness concluded.) 
CHARLES S. CORBIN, 
a wit~ess of lawful age, having been duly sworn according to 
law, testified in his b~balf as follows: 
''That he is the defendant in this action; that at the time 
of bringing this suit and now he is a resident of Franktown, 
Northampton County, Virginia; that he became the owner 
and holder of 100 shares of the capital stock of The Baltimore 
Trust Company of the par value of $10.00 per share on May 
15th and May 20th, 1930, evidenced by certificates number 
03949 and 03973, and has ever since continued to hold and 
own said 100 shares of stock of The Baltimore Trust Com-
pany; that at the time of purchase of said stock his address 
was 1829 Eutaw Place, Baltimore, Maryland; that he received 
and a~cepted five dividend checks of $40.00 each, declared on 
June HO, September 30, December 30, 1930, and March 31 and 
June 30, 19HJ; that he had received at least five written de-
mands from the Receiver of The Baltimore Trust Company 
for payment of the statutory liability assessment upon his 
stock, but that he l1ad refused to pay the same.'' 
(Testimony of witness concluded.) 
page 27 ~ Testimony closed. 
Counsel for plaintiffs and defendant have made up and 
agreed on the record in this cause. 
This bills of exception and certificate is tendered, signed, 
sealed and made a part of the record, this 2nd day of May, 
1941, within sixty days after final judgment had been en-
tered in this cause, and after due notice in writing had been 
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given to the defendant of the time and place at which the 
court would be requested to sign the same. 
JNO. E. NOTTINGHAM, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Northampton County, Virginia. 
A Copy-'reste: 
JNO. E. NOTTINGHAM, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Northampton County, Virginia. 
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In the Circuit Court of Northampton County. 
,John D. Hospelhorn and William F. Ayres, Ancillary Re-
ceivers of the Baltimore Trust Company, a Corporation 
Organized and Existing Under and by Virtue of the Laws 
of the State of Maryland. 
v. 
Charles S. Corbin . 
• JUDGE'S CE.RTIFICATE. 
I, John E. Nottingham, .Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Northampton County, Virginia, do certify that the Bills of 
Exception and certificate containing all the evidence, testi-
mony, exhibits and incidents of the trial, beginning with the 
words, '·Grover L. Michael", and ending with the words, 
'' agreed on the record in this ca use", is a complete and cor-
rect statement of all the testimony, evidence, exhibits and 
other incidents of the trial of the case of John D. Hospelhorn 
, and William F. Ayres, Ancillary Receivers of the Baltimore 
Trust Company, a corporation organized and existing under 
and by virtue of the laws of the State of Maryland v. Charles 
S. Corbin, had in the said court on March 13, 1941. 
Given under my hand this 2nd day of May, 1941, within 
sixtv days of the date on which final judg·ment was rendered 
in said cause and after due notice in writing to the defend-
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ant's counsel of the time and place when and at which the un-
dersigned would be requested to sign the same. 
J:No. E. NOTTINGHAM, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Northampton County, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
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JNO. E. NOTTINGHAM, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Northampton County, Virginia. 
In the Ulerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Northampton 
County. 
I, George T. Tyson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Northamp-
ton County, Virginif!, hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
true, accurate and complete transcript of the record and pro-
ceedings in the action at law under the style of John D. Hos-
pelhorn and "William F. Ayres, Ancillary Receivers of the 
Baltimore Trust Company, a corporation organized and ex-
isting under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Mary-
land, a,qainst Charles S. Corbin, in said court; that the bills 
of exception and certificate containing all the evidence, tes-
timony, exhibits and other incidents of the trial, having been 
prepared, presented and certified in accordance with Section 
6340 A of the Cod~ of Virginia, was accepted as and for a part 
of the transcript of such record, and is accordingly certified. 
And I do further certify that the notice required by Section 
6339 Code of Virginia has been duly given and accepted by 
counsel, as it affirnrn.tively appears from the papers filed in 
said action that counsel of record for defendant had due 
written notice of the intention of the plaintiffs to applv for 
the foregoing· transcript of record, and, further that .. such 
counsel had due written notice of the time and place at which 
the foregoing· bills of exception were tendered to the Judge 
of said Court to he signed, sealed and made a part of the 
record in this action. 
Ghren under my hand as Clerk of said Court, this 16th day 
of May, 1.941. 
GEO. T. TYSON, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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